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. tinct, and the one may exist without the other .... The 
rights of an author of a drama in his composition are two- . 
fold. He is entitled to the profit arising from its per-
formance, and also from the sale of the manuscript, or the 
printing and publishing it." That distinction is impliedly 
recognized by the provisions of section 11 of the copyright 
law. In the present case we may assume that the author 
or his assignee still has the common law right of first publica-
tion,'redress for the infringement of which it is also assumed 
may be sought in the state courts. To support the conten-
tion that Rosen still has the common law right of exclusive 
performance, the respondent relies on certain language in the 
case of Fashion Originators Guild v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 114 Fed. (2d) 80, 83, where it was said: "It certainly 
would be a strangely perverse anomaly that turned the grant 
of statutory copyright into a detriment to the' author'; yet 
it would be hard to prove that the statutory remedies·· con-
ferred made up for the limitation of the monopoly. ,; The 
case did not present a question of the concurrent existence of 
common law and statutory copyright.in the same subject 
matter. The court was discussing the question of the sur-
vival of the common law right after pUblication and apart 
from statute. Its remarks were intended as a refutatIon of 
the contention that after passage of the copyright act, pub-
lication by the author without registering under the act did 
not destroy the common law right. It pointed out that if 
it did not constitute a complete exercise of the common law 
right in every case, an author who copyrighted his work 
would lose rather than gain from compliance with the statute, 
inasmuch as without compliance his monopoly to multiply 
copies would exist forever. 
In Underhill v. Schenck, 193 N. Y. Supp. 745, 748, it was 
stated that the right of exclusive dramatic representation 
"asserted by plaintiff must not be confused with any. right 
of literary property which he might claim as an author either 
under the copyright statutes or at common law." The court 
in that case denied relief for a violation of the copyright by 
production of the play on the ground that relief must be 
sought in the federal courts. The· ~ase of Berry v. Hoffman, 
125 Pa. Super. 261 [189 Atl. 516], recognized that section 2 
of the copyright law referred to those rights existing at 
common law before publication, and upheld in the state forum 
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a claim of copyright before publication apart from the statute . 
The case did not involve any statutory copyright. The case 
of Caruthers v. R. K. O. Radio Pictures, 20 Fed. Supp. 906, 
was commenced in the state court and was transferred to 
the federal court because of diversity of citizenship. It in-
volved only the common law right. It was not shown that 
the work had either been published or copyrighted under the 
statute. 
[4] In the present case, as we have noted, the right 
created under section 11 of the copyright law is not assumed 
to have destroyed any common law right to the first pub-
lication of the dramatic composition. It did secure to the 
holder of the copyright the exclusive right to reproduce the 
play for profit for the term prescribed by the statute. The 
right thus· secured was a substitute for the author's common 
law right of performance, and the plaintiff in the pending 
action is restricted to the remedies afforded by the statute 
for any infringement of that right. The only court in which 
he may seek such redress originally is the United States 
District Court, as specified by section 34 of the copyright 
statute. 
Let the peremptory writ of prohibition issue as prayed. 
Curtis,J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., White, J., 
pro tem., and Pullen, J., pro tem., concurred. 
[L . .A. No. 17553; In Bank.-Aug. 18, 1941.] 
VIRGINI.A M. DILLON, Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF 
. PENSION COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF LOS 
ANGELES et a1., Respondents. 
[1] Mandamus - Defenses - Statute of Limitations.- Code Civ. 
Proc. §§ 312, 338, are applicable to actions in mandamus to en-
force a statutory liability. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1109.) 
[2] Pensions-Actions-Limitations._The right to receive peri-
odic payments under a pension is a continuing one; and any 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Mandamus, § 74; 2. Pensions, § 11; 
3, 6, 7. Police, § 35; 4. Municipal Corporations, § 466; 5. Limitation 
of Actions, § 109. . . 
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time limitation upon the right to sue fo1' each instalment neces-
sarily commences to run from the time when. that instalment 
actually falls due. 
[3a,3b] Police-Actions-Limitations-Pensions.-A cause of ac-
tion to establish the right of a policeman's widow to a pension 
accrues at the time of her husband's death. And a mandamus 
proceeding to establish the right to such pension is barred by, 
Code Civ. Proc., § 338, if commenced more than three years 
after such death, exclusive of the period of the pension board's 
deliberations on the claim. (Talbot v. Oity of Pasadena, 28 
Cal. App. (2d) 271, 82 Pac. (2d) 483, overruled.) 
[4] Municipal Oorporations-Actions-Limitations-Time of De-
man d.-Where a charter provision requires an application to 
a board before a court proceeding, a claimant cannot delay the 
running of the statute of limitations by postponing the time 
of demand upon the proper officials. The statute begins to 
run at the time when he first had the power to make such 
demand. 
[5] Limitation of Actions - Suspension of Statute - Prevention 
from Taking Action.-The running of the statute of limita-
tions is suspended during any period in which the plaintiff is 
legally prevented from taking action to protect his rights. 
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 356.) 
[6] Police-Actions-Limitations - Pensions - Suspension ofPe-
rio d.-The running of the statute of limitations against a 
cause of action to establish the right to a pension is tolled 
during the period of the deliberations of the pension board, 
that is, from the time the claim is filed until the decision of 
the board is rendered. 
[7] Id.-Actions-Limitations-Pensions-Charter Provision Con-
strued.-A charter provision forbidding suit on any claim 
other than for damages unless presented· within six months 
after the accrual of the last item of the account or claim, does 
not affect the time limitation upon the right to bring an action 
of mandamus to establish the right of a policeman's widow to 
a pension, that limitation being governed by the. Code of Civil 
Procedure. Under the charter provision,it is necessary to file 
but one claim with the pension board. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Joseph W. Vickers, Judge. Affirmed. 
3. See 21 Cal. Jur. 415; gOal. Jur. Ten-year Supp., Pocket Part, 
§ 27. 
5. See 16 Cal. Jur. 562, 564. 
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Proceeding in mandamus to compel city pension board to 
issue an order for payment of a pension. Judgment of dis-
missal following the sustaining of a demurrer to the first 
amended petition, without leave to amend, affirmed. 
Pollock & Pollock, Edward 1. Pollock, David Pollock, Theo-
dore A. Horn and Louis Miller for Appellant. 
Ray, L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Frederick von Schrader, 
Assistant City Attorney, and Robert J. Stahl, Deputy City 
Att()rney, for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff's husband, a police officer for the 
city of Los Angeles, committed suicide in April, 1934. Within 
six months, plaintiff made application to the Board of Pension 
Commissioners .. of the City of Los Angeles for a widow's pen-
sion under article 17, section 183 of the charter of the city of 
Los Angeles. The board denied the application in February, 
1935. In December, 1938, plaintiff filed the present proceed-
ing in mandam'Lts to compel the board to issue an order for the 
payment to her of a pension inclllding a cash sum equal to the 
pension funds accrued in the three years preceding the date 
o~ the filing of the petition plus the amount of pension that 
will have accrued from that date to and including the date 
of such order with interest. The petition alleged that plain-
tiff's husband, in the course of his duties as police officer, 
suffered two accidents which caused severe injuries to his body 
and nervous system, giving rise to a condition of mental un-
balance during which he took his life. Defendants demurred 
to the petition on the grounds that the petition did not state 
suffici~mt facts regarding the nature and extent' of the de-
ceased's injuries and his mental condition before death, and 
that any cause of action was barred by the statute of limita-
tions. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave 
to amend, holding that the cause was barred by the statute of 
Umitations. Upon being refused leave to file a second amended 
petition, plaintiff appealed from the judgment of dismissal. 
. [lJ Sections 338 and 312 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
which are applicable to actions in mandamus (Code Civ. 
Proc., sec. 1109), provide that an action upon a liability cre-
ated by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture, must be 
commenced within three years after the cause of action has 
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accrued. Whether or not the plaintiff's action is barred by 
this statute of limitations, therefore, turns upon when her 
cause of action accrued. [2] The right to receive periodic 
payments under a pension is a continuing one (see Dryden v. 
Board of Pension Oommrs., 6 Cal. (2d) 575 [59 Pac. (2d) 
104J ), and any time limitation upon the right to sue for each 
instalment necessarily commences to run from the time when 
that instalment actually falls due. Before plaintiff can claim 
these periodic payments, however, she must establish her 
right to a pension. If the Board of Pension Commissioners· 
refuses to acknowledge this right upon application, she can 
properly bring an action of mandamus in the superior court 
to review the soundness of the board's decision, and to estab-
lish as a matter of law that she is entitled to the status of a 
pensioner. (French v. Cook, 173 Cal. 126 [160 Pac. 411]; 
Sheehan v. Board of Police Commrs., 197 Cal. 70 [239 Pac. 
844J.) An action to determine the existence of the right thus 
necessarily precedes and is distinct from an action to recover 
instalments which have fallen due after the pension has been 
granted. 
[3a] A cause of action accrues when a suit may be main-
tained thereon, and the statute of limitations therefore begins 
to run at that time. (Osborn v. Hopkins, 160 Cal. 501, 506 
[117 Pac. 519, Ann. Oas. 1913A, 413].) The cause of action 
to establish the right to a pension accrued to plaintiff at the 
time of her husband's death. At any time following the 
death she could demand a pension from the board and upon 
refusal could maintain a suit to enforce such action. [4] 
'].1he city charter requires an application to the board before 
court proceedings can be instituted, but it is established in 
Oalifornia that a claimant cannot delay the running of the 
statute of limitations by postponing the time of demand upon 
the proper officials; the statute therefore begins to run at the 
time when the plaintiff first had the power to make such de-
in.and. (Barnes v. Glide, 117 Oal.1 [48 Pac. 804,59 Am. St. Rep. 
153] ; Jones v. Board of Police Oommrs., 141 Oal. 96 [74 Pac. 
696]; Curtin v. Board of Police Commrs., 74 Cal. App. 77 
[239 Pac. 355] ; Wittman v. Board of Palice Commrs., 19 Cal. 
App. 229 [125 Pac. 265J ; Harrigan v.Home Life Insurance 
Co., 128 Oal. 531 [58 Pac. 180, 61 Pac. 99J ; San Luis Obispo 
Oounty v. Gage, 139 O~J. 398 [73 Pac. 174].) Since, how-
ever, action by the ·board must precede court proceedings to 
obtain a pension, a claimant who has applied to the board 
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cannot sue for the pension while the claim is under considera-
tion by the board; [5] It is well recognized that the run-
ning of the statute of limitations is suspended during any 
period in which the plaintiff is legally prevented from taking 
action to protect his rights. (Code Civ. Proc., 356; Wolf v. 
Gall, 174 Cal. 140, 145 [162 Pac. 115J ; Hutchinson v. Ains-
'Worth, 73 Cal. 452 [15 Pac. 82, 2 Am. St. Rep. 823] ; Hoff v. 
Punkenstein, 54 Oal. 233; Union Collection Co. v. Soule, 141 
Cal. 99 [74 Pac. 549] ; Elliott &7 Horne v. Chambers Land Co., 
61 Cal. App.310, 312 [215 Pac. 99] ; see Christin v. Superior 
Court, 9 Cal. (2d) 526 [71 Pac. (2d) 205, 112 A. L. R. 1153] ; 
16 Cal. JUl'. 562, 564.) [6] The running of the statute of 
limitations, therefore, is tolled during the period of the board's 
deliberations, that is, from the time the claim is filed until the 
board's decision is rendered. [3b] In the present case 
plaintiff, upon the death of her husband, had the power to 
apply immediately to the board for a pension and to bring an 
action in mandamus upon its failure to comply. Her cause 
of action therefore accrued at the time of the death of her 
husband. The present action, commenced more than three 
years after that time, exclusive of the period of the board's 
deliberations, is barred by section 338 of the Oode of Civil 
Procedure. Talbot v. Oity of Pasadena, 28 Cal. App. (2d) 
271 [82 Pac. (2d) 483], so far as it is inconsistent with this 
conclusion, is disapproved. 
[7] This decision is not contrary to that· of Dryden v. 
Board of Pension Commissioners, supra, in which the court 
interpreted section 376 of the charter of the city of Los An-
geles which requires that any claim against the city other than 
for damages be presented within six months after the last 
item of the account or claim has accrued. (Stats. 1927, p. 
2014.) With regard to pensions, the court interpreted the 
provision as meaning that a claim could be made to the board 
within six months after the time when any given payment 
would have accrued had the right to a pension been estab-
lished. Thus, a claimant can assert his right to a pension 
before the board at any time after the event giving rise to 
the claim has occurred so long as the claim is 'made within 
six months after any payment would have accrued. If the 
pension is granted he is entitled to receive payments in the 
future but can recover only those past payments which would 
have accrued within a period six months prior to the time of the 
making of the claim. Thi·Sresult is compelled by the peculiar 
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wording of the charter provision, which establishes as the point 
of reference for the running of the six months' period, not 
the time when the right to the pension first accrues, but the 
time at which the last item of the claim accrues. In the case 
of pensions, items accrue indefinitely. 
The charter provision, however, does not affect the time 
limitation upon the right of the plaintiff to bring an action 
of mandam1ls in the superior court. That limitation, which 
begins to run when the right first accrues, is governed by the 
Code of Civil Procedure. ' A claimant may assert the right to 
a pension before the board at any time within six months after 
the time when any payment would accrue under the pension; 
but if the board denies the claim, the claimant has no remedy 
by mandamus in the courts if more than three years have 
elapsed from the time when the right first arose exclusive of 
the time the matter was under consideration by the board. 
The charter provision does not, of course, require a claimant 
to make a succession of claims every six months in order to 
keep alive his right pending court action, but requires the 
filing of only one claim with the board. If he does so and 
his claim is refused he may thereafter maintain an action in 
the superior court at any time within three years from the 
time when the right first accrued. 
Since the plaintiff's action here was commenced more than 
three years after the time when her cause of action accrued, 
the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Pullen, 
JO., pro tem., concurred. ' 
CARTER, J., dissenting :-1 dissent. 
According to the allegations of appellant's petition for a 
writ of mandate, appellant is the widow of Arnold Dillon, a 
former member of the Los Angeles Police Department. Dillon 
died on April 15, 1934. In September, 1935, appellant filed 
an application for a pension with the respondent Board of 
Pension Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles. That 
application was denied by respondent on February 26, 1935. 
On December 5, 1938, appellant filed in the superior court a 
petition for a writ of mandate to compel the respondent tQ 
make an order awarding her a pension and that said pension 
be paid. The superior court entered a judgment of dis-
missal after a demurrer was sustained and a request to amend 
Aug. 1941.] DILLON V. BOARD OF PENSION COMMRS. 
[18 C. (2d) 427] 
433 
refused. From that judgment appellant appeals. The de-
murrer was sustained on the ground that the proceeding was 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
The basis of appellant's claim to a pension is found in ar-
ticle 17, section 183 of the charter of Los Angeles. That sec-
tion provides: 
"Whenever a member of the police or fire department shall 
die as a result of any injury received during the performance 
of his duty, or other sickness caused by the discharge of such 
duty, or after retirement ... then an annual pension shall 
be paid in equal monthly installments to his widow ... in an 
amount equal to one-half (Yz) of the average monthly rate of 
salary which said deceased member shall have received in 
such department during the three years immediately preced-
ing the time of his death or the date of his retirement .... 
Said pension shall be paid to the widow during her lifetime 
or until she remarries .... " 
The Los Angeles Charter, article 28, section 376, in re-
spect to claims against, the city, provides that no suit may 
be broughton a demand unless a claim is filed within six 
months after the last item of the claim accrues. 
The statute of limitations here invoked is section 338 (1) of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, establishing a three year period 
of limitation on actions upon a liability created by statute. 
It cannot be doubted that that section is applicable to an action 
for the recovery of the pension here involved. 
To ascertain whether or not appellant's action is barred, it 
is of course necessary to determine when her action accrued 
as that is the point of commencement of the running of the 
statute. That problem has been solved by this court in the 
recent case of Dryden v. Board of Pension Commissioners, 6 
Cal. (2d) 575 [59 Pae. (2d) 104]. There a police officer of 
Los Angeles was killed in the line of duty. Ten months after 
his death the widow filed an application for a pension with the 
Board of Pension Commissioners. The application was denied 
and the widow sought in the superior court to compel the 
payment of the pension by mandamus. The superior court 
held that her action for the writ of mandate was barred be-
cause of her failure to file a claim within six months after her 
husband's death as required by section 346 of the Los An-
geles City Charter. This court reversed the lower court holding 
that an obligation to pay a pension is a continuing one, each 
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monthly installment being a separate cause of action accruing 
at the time it became due, and that therefore the claim may 
be filed at any time after death but petitioner could recover 
no more than the installments accruing within the six months' 
period preceding the filing thereof. This court said in that 
case at page 580: 
"The right to pension payments is a contin'Uing right. 
Petitioner by her conduct may have barred herself from col-
lecting payments which have accrued, but this does not mean 
that she is without means to enforce the right to present and 
future pension payments, as distinguished from past and 
accrued pension payments, provided she proceeds to do so in 
the manner required by law. The distinction between a 
single covenant and a continuing covenant is well settled in 
the law. (McGlynn v. Moore, 25 Cal. 384, 395; German-
American Savings Bank v. GoUmer, 155 Cal. 683 [102 Pac. 
932, 24 L. R. A. (N. S) 1066]; M'Ulborn v. Montezuma Im-
provement 00., 69 Cal. App. 621 [232 Pac. 162] ; Woodard v. 
Glenwood Lumber 00., 171 Cal. 513 [153 Pac. 951] ; Grotheer 
v. Panama-Pacific Land 00., 41 Cal. App. 19, 22 [181 Pac. 
667] ; Oongregation of Roman Oatholic Ohurch of Ascension 
v. Texas & P. Ry. 00.,41 Fed. 5-64.) A case directly in point 
is Gaffney v. Young et al., 200 Iowa, 1030 [205 N. W. 865]. 
In the Gaffney case, the deceased husband of the petitioner in 
said action, died on January 18, 1912, of illness as result of 
exposure suffered in the performance of his duties as a police-
man. Petitioner filed application for pension on September 
19, 1924, more than twelve years after the death of her hus-
band. The claim was rejected. There were no charter pro-
visions requiring the presentation of a claim within six months 
or within any other period of time, but in the Gaffney case, 
as in the Hermanson case, 219 Cal. 622 [28 Pac. (2d) 21], the 
plea of the statute of limitations was raised. The court 
passed directly upon the question and said: 
" 'The question here is whether, when the right of the ap-
pellee to a pension accrued and vested iuher on the death of 
her husband, the right to enforce it may be wholly lost or 
barred by a failure to do so within the period of any statutory 
limitation. The act providing for the creation of the pension 
fund and for the payment of pensions from it fixes no limit of 
time within which application for a pension must be made or 
action to enforce the right commenced. The appellee's right to 
the pension, assuming it to exist, and to the payments to be 
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made monthly would continue during her life, so long as she 
remained unmarried and of good moral character. The right 
was and is a continuing one, and, so far as present and future 
payments are concerned, we are of the opinion it. was one she 
could enforce at -any time upon proof· of the facts sustaining 
it .... 
" 'If appellee was, on the death of her husband, entitled to 
a pension,her. right to present and future payments from the 
pension fund is not barred by al+Y provision of the statute of 
limi ta tions. . . . 
" 'Counsel for appellants relies. upon Nicolsv. Board of 
Oom'rs., 1 Cal. App. 494 [82 Pac. 557]· ... and Lund v. 
]{inneapolis etc. Relief Ass'n., 137 Minn.' 395 [163 N. W. 
742] ... as holding that a claim for a pension may be barred 
by the statute of limitations .... In neither of these cases 
was the fact that the right to the pension. was a continuing 
one considered.' ( Italics ours.) 
" 'It may be added that in the case of Nicols v. Board of 
Oommissioners, supra, the claim made was in its entirety for 
past accrued payments. The same questIOn was therefore not 
before the court on the facts of that case, and for that very 
good reason is not even considered. 
" 'It is our opinion that the petitioner is entitled to all 
those periodic pension payments which fell due within a 
period of six months prior to her application to the Board of 
Pension Commissioners, and to all those periodic pension pay-
ments which have accrued since that date and which will con-
tinue to accrue in the future under the provisions of section 
183 of the charter.' " 
It necessarily follows that if the obligation is a continuing 
one, and the obligation to pay each installment accrues 
when the same becomes payable, and the issue for determina-
tion is whether or not a claim has been filed in time, the same 
·rule applies as·' when the statute of limitations is involved. 
rrhere cannot logically or reasonably be two accrual dates for 
the obligation to pay a pension, that is, one to be applied with 
respect to the time when a claim must be filed and the other 
with· respect to the time of commencement of the statutory 
period of limitation. The Dryden case is wholly decisive of 
the issue here presented. 
The attempt of the majority opinion to escape the sound 
conclusion of the Dryden case is neither persuasive nor based 
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upon an accurate analysis thereof. The majority opinion con-
cedes that under the DrYden case" any time limitation upon 
the right to sue for each installment necessarily commences 
to run from the time when that installment actually falls 
due, " but then proceeds to the conclusion that when man-
damus is involved,. as in the case at bar, the matter to be de-
termined is the right to the status of a pensioner as distin-
guished from the right to each installment as it becomes pay~ 
able. It omits to state that the proceeding in the Dryden 
case was also a proceeding to obtain a writ of mandate and 
the status of petitioner as a pensioner was fully as much in-
volved in that case as in the case at bar; it was not an action 
to recover installments of the pension. But in any event 
there is no true basis for a distinction between the two types 
of proceeding. In an ordinary common law action to recover 
pension installments the gist of the action would be the pri-
mary consideration of whether the plaintiff was entitled to a 
pension, that is, his status as a pensioner. 
The Dryden case is not properly distinguishable on the 
ground that the court there determined that the meaning of 
section 346 of the charter was "that a claim could be made 
to the Board within six months after the time when any given 
payment would have accrued had the right to a pension been 
established." The proceeding in the Dryden case was, as 
above seen, for the express purpose of establishing the right 
to the pension, and was not one to recover an installment of 
the pension after the right thereto had been ascertained. Nor 
may that case be distinguished on the ground that there is any 
difference between when the time commences to run within 
which a claim must be presented and when the statute of 
limitations commences to run. The Dryden case relies upon 
and quotes extensively from the case of Gaffney v. Young, 200 
Iowa 1030 . [205 N. W. 865]. The Gaffney case involved a 
statute of limitations in respect to pensions rather than a claim 
requirement, and held that the statute commences to run from 
each installment as it became payable. 
The majority opinion then arrives at the unsupportable 
conclusion that a pension claimant may file his claim and have 
it considered at any time for future installments and those 
accruing within six months prior to the time the claim is 
filed, but if the board rejects the claim he is without remedy if 
more than three years, exclusive of the time the board is con-
sidering the claim, have expired since the death from which 
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the right to a pension is derived. Such strange results are not 
compelled by the claim provision. Logically and reasonably 
the point of commencement of the running of the time should 
be the same whether the claim provision or the statute of 
limitations is involved. 
It may be that the result of such a conclusion is that a claim 
must be filed for each installment of pension, but there is 
tlOthing unusual or unreasonable in such a condition. Condi-
tions may arise from time to time such as the marriage of the 
p'ension claimant, which would defeat her' right to the con-
tinuation of the pension. The filing of the claim for each 
i.nstallment would insure the discontinuance of payments for 
pensions no longer payable. It is required that municipal 
civil service employees must file claims for their 'salaries. 
(Shannon v. City of Los Angeles, 205 Cal. 366 [270 Pac. 
682] .) 
It is recognized that the statute does not run on a continu,. 
ing obligation under a contract except as to those obligations 
falling due prior to the statutory time before the commence,:" 
ment of the action. (De Uprey v. De Uprey, 23 Cal. 352; 
Hinkel v. Crowson, 83 Cal. App. 87 [256 Pac. 479] ; Bissell v. 
Forbes, 1 CaL App. 606 [82 Pac. 698] ; Trigg v. Arnott, 22 
Cal. App. (2d) 155 [71 Pac. (2d) 330] ; Lee v. DeForest, 22 
Cal. App. (2d) 351 [71 Pac. (2d) 285] ; Reuter v. Pacific Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 5 Cal. App. (2d) 333 [43 Pac. (2d ) 576].) 
There is no valid reason why the same rule should not apply 
to pensions. A pension claimant should be able to file a 
claim at any time for installments falling due within six 
months prior to the date of filing, and to have a remedy either 
by mand,amtls or ordinary civil action within three years after 
the rejection of the claim by the board. 
It is conceded in the majority opinion that a cause of 
action accrues when a suit may be maintained thereon, and 
the statute of limitations begins to run at that time. (Osborn 
v. Hopkins, 160 Cal. 501 [117 Pac. 519, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 
413].) It is also held that no proceeding for mandamus will 
lie until after a claim has been filed and rejected. rrhere-
lore, since no suit can be maintained until after the filing 
and rejection of a claim, no cause of action accrues which puts 
into operation the statute of limitations. It is conceded that 
the case of Dryden v. Board of Pension Commissioners, supra, 
correctly holds that a claim may be filed at any time for in. 
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stallments falling due within the last preceding six months. 
The inescapable conclusion that must necessarily follow is 
that the statute does not run until three years after a claim 
il': rejected, which claim may be filed at any time, yet the ma-
jority opinion arrives at the opposite conclusion. Such· in~ 
consiste~cy is obvious on the face of the opinion. The only 
attempt to reconcile that illogical conclusion is the assertion 
that the charter provision as to claims cannot affect the state 
statute of limitations. It cannot be doubted however that the 
charter may affect some of the elements necessary to be de-
termined preliminarily in applying the statute of limitations, 
namely, the condition precedent to the bringing of any suit, 
that is, the filing of a claim. .A. municipality may require 
the filing of a claim as a prerequisite to action on any claim 
against it. (Dryden v. Board of Pension Com'rs., supra; 
Yolo County v. Sacramento, 36 Cal. 193; Farmers & Mer-
chants Bank of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles, 151 Cal. 655 [91 
Pac. 795]; Geimann v. Board of Police Commissioners, 158 
Cal. 748 [112 Pac. 553] ; Chapman v. City of Fullerton, 90 
Cal. App. 463 [265 Pac. 1035] ; Southern Pac. Co. v. Santa 
Cruz, 26 Cal. .A.pp. 26 [145 Pac. 736] ; Brown v. Board of Po-
lice Commissioners, 2 Cal. .A.pp. (2d) 245 [37 Pac. (2d) 737] ; 
Shannon v. Los Angeles, 205 Cal. 366 [270 Pac. 682].) It 
necessarily follows that to the extent at least as to when the 
cause of action· to recover pension installments accrues, the 
charter claim provision does control the state statute of limi-
tations, and the latter becomes operative only upon the rejec-
tion of the pensioner's claim; . 
In my opinion the law should be as held in the Dryden case, 
supra, that the right to a pension is a continuing one; that the 
statute of limitations does not commence to run until a claim 
is filed and rejected, and then only as to installments covered 
by the claim. Petitioner should therefore be permitted to 
file another claim and' maintain an action thereon if the same 
is rejected. 
Appellant'8 petition for a rehearing was denied September 
18, 1941. 
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JOHN R. WALSH, Appellant, v. MIRIAM C. WALSH, 
Respondent. 
[1] Judgments - Summary Judgments -Determination of Exist-
ence of Issue of Fact.-In passing upon a motion for summary 
judgment, the primary duty of the trial court is to determine 
whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. If it finds one, 
it is then powerless to proceed further, but must allow such 
issue to be tried by a jury unless a jury trial is waived. Issue 
finding rather than issue determination is the pivot upon which 
the· ·summary judgment law turns. 
[2a,2b] Id.-Summary Judgments-Issue of Fact-Ambiguity in 
Contract.-In an action by a son as third-party-beneficiary 
under a property settlement agreement which, after giving the 
wife custody of the children of the parties, contains an agree-
ment on her part to maintain "said child or children" so long 
as she received the payments provided for, a motion for sum-
mary judgment should be denied where it appears that there 
is an issue as to whether the quoted words are words of de-
scription merely or words of limitation, which issue is to be 
determined after the receiving of evidence, in other words, an 
issue of fact. 
[3] Contraets-Interpretation-Function of Trial Court.-When a 
contract is in any of its terms or provisions ambiguous or un-
certain, it is primarily the duty of the, trial court to construe 
it after a full opportunity afforded all the parties in the case 
to produce evidence of the facts, circumstances. and conditions 
surrounding its execution and the conduct of the parties rela-
tive thereto. 
[4] Evidence,.-Extrinsic Evidence-Evidence in Aid· of Interpre-
tation-Intention of Parties.-Where· the language of a con-
tract is fairly susceptible of either one of two constructions 
without doing violence to its usual and ordinary import; ex-
trinsic evidence may be resorted to for the purpose of ex-
plaining the intention of the parties. For this purpose con-
versations between and declarations of the parties during the 
negotiations at and before the execution of the contract may 
be shown. 
4. See 6 Cal. Jur. 249; 10 Cal. Jur. 930; 20 Am. Jur. 994 .. 
McK. Dig. References: 1, 2, 6. Judgments, § 8a; 3. Contracts, 
§ 161; 4. Evidence, § 399; 5. Contracts, § 163. 
